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III. CONCLUSION
In American Transfer & Storage Co. v. Brown the Dallas court of civil
appeals addressed the issue of whether the Carmack Amendment to the
Interstate Commerce Act preempts the DTPA. In holding that the Car-
mack Amendment does not preempt the DTPA, the court focused its anal-
ysis on the divergent purposes of the two statutes, concluding that the
DTPA does not obstruct the full purposes and objectives of the Carmack
Amendment. To support its preemption analysis, the court looked to the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
City of Detroit. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, however, suggest
that a preemption analysis on a comparison of the statutes' purposes is no
longer valid. Moreover, Huron is of limited precedential value because it
addressed a state's deeply rooted interest in regulating local pollution
problems.
Judicial precedent suggests that the scope of the Carmack Amendment
is broader than that delineated by Brown. The Supreme Court has found
that transactions incident to the interstate transportation of goods, even
though a bill of lading has not been issued, are within the purview of the
amendment. The Supreme Court has also declared that the provisions of
the Carmack Amendment are broad enough to include all damages result-
ing from any carrier breach of duty within its transportation function.
These authorities require the conclusion that American's representations
were within the amendment. Applying the DTPA to Brown's claim ob-
structed the amendment's declared purpose of providing uniformity for
carrier liability for loss of, or damage to, interstate shipments. The effect
of the Brown decision is again to subject carriers operating in several states
to diverse measures of damages.
The Brown court was presented with a second issue of whether a con-
sumer may recover damages for mental anguish under the DTPA. The
court concluded that the DTPA did not liberalize common law rules relat-
ing to recovery for mental anguish. Accordingly, as Brown could not re-
cover for mental anguish under common law, the court concluded that
Brown could not recover for mental anguish under the DTPA.
Bill Van Wagner
Clarification of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's Antitrust
Exemption for the Business of Insurance: Group
Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.
As part of a state-approved plan to provide group health insurance cov-
erage in Texas, Group Life and Health Insurance Company, also known
as Blue Shield of Texas, offered a plan of prescription drug insurance
under which the insured would pay two dollars for each prescription drug
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purchased from a participating pharmacy. To enlist participant pharma-
cies Blue Shield offered to enter into a Pharmacy Agreement with each
licensed pharmacy in San Antonio.' If a policyholder patronized a non-
participating pharmacy, he was required to pay the full price for a drug
and then was allowed only partial reimbursement from Blue Shield.'
Eighteen nonparticipating pharmacies brought an antitrust action against
Blue Shield and three participating pharmacies, alleging that the Phar-
macy Agreements resulted in price-fixing and a boycott of nonparticipat-
ing pharmacies in violation of the Sherman Act.3 The defendants argued
that the Pharmacy Agreements were exempt from the antitrust laws under
section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act' because the agreements were
the "business of insurance."5 The district court granted summary judg-
ment for the defendants.6 On appeal the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Pharmacy Agreements
were not part of the "business of insurance" for the purposes of section
2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and therefore were subject to antitrust
scrutiny.7 In order to resolve an intercircuit conflict over the meaning of
1. Under the terms of the Pharmacy Agreement Blue Shield agreed to reimburse the
pharmacy for the pharmacy's cost of acquiring the drug. Thus, participation in the plan was
effectively limited to those pharmacies that could afford to distribute drugs for a $2 markup.
2. Blue Shield would pay the policyholder 75% of the difference between $2 and the
full price charged by a nonparticipating pharmacy. For example, if the full price for a drug
was $10, the insured would pay the nonparticipating pharmacy $10 and would receive $6
from Blue Shield. Six dollars represents 75% of $8, the difference between the $10 retail
price and $2. Thus, the insured's net cost is $4. In contrast, if he purchased the drug at a
participating pharmacy his net cost is only $2. Therefore, the plan encourages insureds to
partronize pharmacies participating in the plan.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). Section 1 provides in part: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States . . .is declared to be illegal .
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976).
5. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976) provides in part:
§ 1011. Declaration of policy
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that
silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any bar-
rier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.
§ 1012. Regulation by State law; Federal law relating specifically to insur-
ance; applicability of certain Federal laws after June 30, 1948
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be
subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxa-
tion of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or super-
sede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance ....
§ 1013. Suspension until June 30, 1948, of application of certain Federal
laws; Sherman Act applicable to agreements to, or acts of, boycott, coercion,
or intimidation
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act
inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boy-
cott, coercion, or intimidation.
6. 415 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
7. 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977).
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the term "business of insurance,"8 the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Held, affirmed- The Pharmacy Agreements do not con-
stitute the "business of insurance" within the meaning of section 2(b) of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act and thus are not exempt from the application
of federal antitrust law. Group Lfe & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug
Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
I. THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association9 the Supreme
Court held that insurance transactions were interstate commerce' ° and
subject to federal antitrust laws." This decision ended almost a century of
exclusive regulation by the states of the insurance industry.' 2 The furor' 3
over this decision prompted congressional passage of the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act 14 one year later. 'I
8. The decision of the Fifth Circuit conflicted with previous decisions of the Third
Circuit (Frankford Hospital v. Blue Cross, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir. 1977)), the Fourth Circuit
(Anderson v. Medical Serv., 551 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1977)), and the District of Columbia
Circuit (Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977), vacated
and remanded, 99 S. Ct. 1417, 58 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1979)).
9. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). The defendants were charged with conspiring to fix insurance
rates and commissions. The Court specifically condemned such activities after finding that
Congress did not intend that the business of insurance should be exempt from the operation
of the Sherman Act. Id. at 562. See generally Partridge, States Rights and Insurance-4fter
SE...A., 1945 INS. L.J. 265.
10. The Court stated that "[n]o commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its
activities across state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Con-
gress under the Commerce Clause. We cannot make an exception of the business of insur-
ance." 322 U.S. at 553.
i1. The Court concluded: "A general application of the [Sherman] Act to all combina-
tions of business and capital organized to suppress commercial competition is in harmony
with the spirit and impulses of the times which gave it birth." Id. The Court also stated:
"By no means [did] ... the Congress of 1890 specifically [intend] to exempt insurance com-
panies from the all-inclusive scope of the Sherman Act." Id. at 560.
12. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869), the leading case before South-
Eastern Underwriters, contained a dictum to the effect that the "[i]ssuing [of] a policy of
insurance is not a transaction of commerce." It was therefore assumed by many that the
federal government had no authority over the insurance industry under the commerce
clause. As a result, there was a tradition of exclusive state regulation of insurance transac-
tions. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913); Hooper
v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895). See generally B. GAVIT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1970); Powell, Insurance as Commerce in Constitution and
Statute, 57 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1944).
13. After the Court's decision segments of the insurance industry argued that applica-
tion of the antitrust laws to the industry was not feasible and that a total exemption from the
federal antitrust laws was necessary for the conduct of business. The insurance industry
contended that if rate fixing were eliminated, the resulting price competition would threaten
the financial stability of many companies. Further, the vigorous enforcement of the antitrust
laws would prevent the industry from pooling loss statistics and thereby hamper their ability
to compute premium rates. See generally Note, Federal Regulation of Insurance Companies-
The Disappearing McCarren Act Exemption, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1340. Other groups in the
industry, as well as state insurance officials, focused on the need to preserve state regulatory
and taxing powers. As one commentator wrote after South-Eastern Underwriters: "[t]he
validity of every state statute, court decision, and departmental ruling relating to regulation
or taxation of insurance became immediately questionable." E. SAWYER, INSURANCE AS
INTERSTATE COMMERCE 51 (1945).
14. See note 5 supra.
15. See generally Note, A Year OfSE UA., 23 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 317 (1945) (discuss-
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The McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts from scrutiny under the federal
antitrust laws insurance company conduct that is (a) the "business of in-
surance," (b) regulated by the state, and (c) not a boycott. 6 To invoke the
exemption, all three statutory requirements must be satisfied. 7 Therefore,
if the challenged activities do not constitute the business of insurance, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act is inapplicable despite the existence of state regu-
lation or the absence of a boycott.' 8 For this reason, the characterization
of what constitutes the "business of insurance" is critical.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act does not define the term "business of in-
surance." Additionally, congressional debate on the issue was brief and
ambiguous.' 9 Among insurance scholars there is no consensus as to the
meaning of the term2" and the courts have had scant opportunity to con-
sider the issue in the thirty-four years since the Act's passage. 2' Neverthe-
less, two cases, SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. of America22
and SEC v. National Securities, Inc. ,23 have indicated how the Supreme
ing state insurance commissioners' and insurance industry pressures on Congress prior to
passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012 & 1013(b) (1976). See generally Note, Insurance Under The Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act, 33 GEO. L.J. 321 (1945).
17. See, e.g., Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39, 49 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80, 82 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973). See generally Rosdeitcher, Recent Judicial Interpretations of
the McCarran Act Antitrust Exemption, 13 FORUM 873 (1978).
18. See, e.g., SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); SEC v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959); American Family Life Assurance Co. v.
Planned Marketing Assocs., 389 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1974); American Gen. Ins. Co. v.
FTC, 359 F. Supp. 887 (S.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd, 496 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1974).
19. See generally SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 458-59 (1969); Rosdeitcher,
supra note 17. The legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides support for
conflicting conclusions as to what Congress meant by the term business of insurance. For
example, one commentator has written that there is no indication that Congress understood
the term business of insurance to include anything more than its plain meaning suggests.
Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act's Antitrust Exemption for Insurance.- Language, History
andPolicy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587, 628. This plain meaning concept would include such activ-
ities as cooperative service agreements, reinsurance agreements, the use of advisory rates,
rules or plans, and the use of mandatory state approved rates or forms. See 90 CONG. REC.
A4406 (1944). Further, Congress seemed to assume that the theory of insurance was the
distribution of risks according to hazard, experience, and the law of averages. See S. REP.
No. 1112, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1944); 90 CONG. REC. 6526 (1944) (remarks of Rep. Han-
cock). As a result, because cost containment efforts reflected none of these factors and were
within the control of the insurance companies, they were not considered to be the business of
insurance. See H.R. REP. No. 873, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1943). Nevertheless, remarks
by Senator Murdock have been cited to support the broader conclusion that the business of
insurance was intended by many Congressmen to be synonymous with insurance companies.
See 91 CONG. REC. 480 (1945).
20. One expert remarked: "Because the purposes for which definitions of insurance are
invoked differ, no single definition will serve always, even in a single jurisdiction." R. KEE-
TON, BASic TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 2 (1971). For a more complete discussion on the
variety of meanings attributed to insurance, see id. at 2-11.
21. See Rosdeitcher, supra note 17, at 873.
22. 359 U.S. 65 (1959). See generally Note, Insurance-Securities-Variable Annuity
Contracts, 12 Sw. L.J. 514 (1958); Note, Annuities-Government Regulation-Insurance-In-
vestment-Sale of Variable Annuity Contracts Held Subject to Federal Securities Regulation,
38 TEXAS L. REV. 248 (1959).
23. 393 U.S. 453 (1969). See generally The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L.
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Court might define the term business of insurance when directly con-
fronted with the question.24
In Variable Annuity Life the respondent corporations, which called
themselves life insurance companies and were regulated by the insurance
commissioners of several states, offered variable annuity contracts 25 for
sale in interstate commerce. The Securities Act of 1933 specifically ex-
cludes any insurance policy and any insurance company from its cover-
age. 26 The respondents argued that the variable annuity contracts they
offered were insurance within the ambit of this exclusion. 27 The Court
found that the annuity contracts were neither insurance nor annuity poli-
21
cies. Central to this conclusion was the Court's statement that insurance
involved some investment risk-taking on the part of the insurance com-
pany, an element absent from the variable annuity contract.29 The Court
emphasized the underwriting of risks as "the one earmark of insurance as
it has commonly been conceived of in popular understanding and us-
age."3o
In National Securities the Securities and Exchange Commission alleged
that National Securities made misrepresentations and omissions of mate-
rial facts in an attempt to secure stockholder approval of a merger between
an independent insurance company and an insurance company controlled
by National Securities. Despite SEC intervention, the merger was ap-
proved by the Arizona Director of Insurance and later consummated. The
SEC sought to unwind the merger, but National Securities argued that the
federal securities laws were inapplicable because the McCarran-Ferguson
REV. 7, 252 (1969); Note, Securities-Rule lOb-5-Shareholder Action Approving a Merger Is
a Purchase or Sale of Securities Within the Antfraud Pro visions of the Securities Exchange
Act, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 1238 (1969).
24. Although the Supreme Court has not directly dealt with the term business of insur-
ance and the McCarran-Ferguson Act in an antitrust context, it has dealt with other issues
under the Act. Three cases dealt with the validity of state regulation and taxation of insur-
ance. Compare Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946), and Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), with State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451
(1962). Two cases dealt with the preemptive effects of state law on federal law. Compare
FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960), with FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357
U.S. 560 (1958). Two cases dealt with the preemptive effects of state insurance law in the
context of admiralty. Compare Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310
(1955), with Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
The Court did not specifically address the antitrust exemption until 1978. In St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978), the issue was the meaning of the boycott
exemption in § 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The adequacy of regulation by state
law for the purposes of § 2(b) has yet to be considered by the Court.
25. The contracts had some of the features of conventional life insurance and annuity
contracts with the exception that purchasers were entitled not to a fixed return but only to
fluctuating amounts based on a pro rata participation in the companies' investment portfo-
lios. 359 U.S. at 70-71.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1976).
27. See 359 U.S. at 70. The question common to the exemption provisions of the Secur-
ities Act of 1933 and § 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is whether the insurance com-
pany and the contract it issues are subject to state insurance regulation.
28. Id. at 71-73.
29. Id. at 71. To the contrary, the annuitant assumed all of the risk under the contracts
in question.
30. 359 U.S. at 73.
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Act protects state insurance laws from preemption by federal law.3 The
Court rejected this argument and held that a state statute for the protection
of the interests of insurance company stockholders was not a state attempt
to regulate the business of insurance.32 The Court noted that the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act was not designed to make the states supreme in regulat-
ing all the activities of insurance companies.33 The language of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act refers not to the persons or companies subject to
state regulation, but to laws regulating the business of insurance.34 The
Court concluded that the core of the business of insurance was the contract
of insurance, specifically "[t]he relationship between insurer and insured,
the type of policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation and
enforcement."35 Therefore, although the Arizona statute applied only to
insurance companies, such regulation was not within the scope of the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act because it operated to protect stockholders of the
insurer as opposed to purchasers of insurance policies.
36
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in National Securities, lower fed-
eral courts had little opportunity to define the limits of the antitrust ex-
emption for the business of insurance.37  The language in National
Securities appeared to provide clear guidelines as to what constituted the
business of insurance. Subsequently, relying on National Securities, the
courts considered such concepts as the obligation of the insurance com-
pany to its insured as provided for in the contract of insurance,38 the requi-
site closeness between the challenged conduct and the relationship
between the insurer and policyholder, 39 and the reliability of the insurer.4"
Several courts further considered additional criteria such as whether state
31. 393 U.S. at 456; see note 5 supra for text of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
32. 393 U.S. at 457.
33. Id. at 459 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945)).
34. 393 U.S. at 459. According to the Court, the business of insurance would include
the fixing of rates, the selling and advertising of policies, and the licensing of companies and
their agents. Id. at 460.
35. Id. at 460. The Court added:
Undoubtedly, other activities of insurance companies relate so closely to their
status as reliable insurers that they too must be placed in the same class. But
whatever the exact scope of the statutory term, it is clear where the focus




37. E.g., Hill v. National Auto Glass Co., 293 F. Supp. 295, 296 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
38. See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977), va-
cated and remanded, 99 S. Ct. 1417, 58 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1979); Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life
& Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977).
39. See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977), va-
cated and remanded, 99 S. Ct. 1417, 58 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1979); Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975); Schwartz v. Common-
wealth Land Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Hill v. National Auto Glass
Co., 293 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
40. See Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973);
Manasen v. California Dental Servs., 424 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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law treated the activities as the business of insurance, 4' whether the activi-
ties had a substantial effect on insurance rates, 42 whether the purpose of
the activity was solely to control costs or included the intent to restrain
trade,43 and whether the business activity of the insurance company was
peculiar to the insurance industry." As a result, despite the apparent clar-
ity of the Court's language in National Securities, in at least one situation
45
courts were sharply divided as to the meaning of the business of insur-
ance.
46
41. See Lawyers Title Co. v. St. Paul Title Ins. Corp., 526 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1975);
Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 415 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
42. See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977), va-
cated and remanded, 99 S. Ct. 1417, 58 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1979); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross,
481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973).
43. See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977), va-
cated and remanded, 99 S. Ct. 1417, 58 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1979).
44. See Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977);
American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Planned Marketing Assocs., 389 F. Supp. 1141
(E.D. Va. 1974); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 359 F. Supp. 887 (S.D. Tex. 1973), affid,
496 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1974).
45. The primary concern of Congress in the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was
preservation within the insurance industry of restraints on trade that applied to the business
of insurance. Only activities between insurance companies, brokers, and agents were con-
templated by Congress. See generally Weller, supra note 19, at 625-33. While the courts
were in agreement as to the application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption to intra-
industry restraints of trade, a major disagreement existed when the restraint of trade was
inter-industry. An inter-industry restraint of trade arises when the activities of an insurance
company adversely affect the relationships between competing noninsurance industries. As
one writer sees the issue:
The critical issue which has now arisen is whether the business of insurance
encompasses conduct which very plainly affects the relationship between the
insurance company and its policyholders, the reliability and solvency of the
company and the obligations of the insurance company to its insured, but at
the same time also affects integrally-related economic interests of health care
providers and other industries which provide insured services. The issue is
raised in the context of insurance company efforts to control costs of insured
services, which in turn directly affect claims costs and premiums.
Rosdeitcher, supra note 17, at 876.
46. Compare Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
vacated and remanded, 99 S. Ct. 1417, 58 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1979) (insurance companies' agree-
ment with repair shops to provide insureds with automobile repairs only at a prevailing rate
was the business of insurance because of the close relation between the challenged conduct
and the insurer-insured relationship), and Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co.,
374 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (fees charged to sellers of real estate by title insurance
companies and their agents were the business of insurance because of the close relation of
the provision of services by realty sellers to the realty conveyance with which title insurance
was associated), with Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974) (insur-
ance policies for burial benefits obtainable only through insurers' wholly owned subsidiary
might not constitute the business of insurance), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975), and Hill v.
National Auto Glass Co., 293 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (insurer's practice of placing
repair business of its claimants with certain preselected glass installers did not constitute the
business of insurance). Compare Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.)
(agreements between insurance company and hospitals to assure performance of the in-
surer's obligation to insureds under the policy are closely related to the reliability of the
insurer and therefore are the business of insurance), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973), and
Manasen v. California Dental Servs., 424 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (contracts between
nonprofit corporation engaged in administration and operation of prepaid dental care pro-
grams and participating dentists entitled to antitrust exemption as the business of insurance
because the contracts directly related to insurer reliability), with Royal Drug Co. v. Group
10991979] NO TES
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II. GROUP LIFE & HEALTH INSURANCE CO. V. ROYAL DRUG CO.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve conflicts as to the
meaning of the phrase business of insurance.47 The sole issue before the
Court was whether the Pharmacy Agreements were the business of insur-
ance within the meaning of section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.48
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,49 emphasized that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act's language exempts the business of insurance and not the
business of insurance companies. 50 He identified the spreading and the
underwriting of risks as the primary elements of the business of insur-
ance.5 The Court rejected Blue Shield's argument that the Pharmacy
Agreements involved the underwriting of risks. 2 The Court distinguished
the insurance policies, which insured against the risk that policyholders
would be unable to pay for prescription drugs during the period of cover-
age, from the Pharmacy Agreements, which the Court observed served
only to minimize the costs Blue Shield incurred in fulfilling its underwrit-
ing obligations. 3 The Pharmacy Agreements, then, were merely arrange-
ments by Blue Shield for the purchase of goods and services.54
The Court noted that the core of the business of insurance, the relation-
ship between the insurance company and the policyholder, did not exist
between the parties to the Pharmacy Agreements.5 The Pharmacy Agree-
ments were separate contractual arrangements between Blue Shield and
particular pharmacies.56 Nevertheless, Blue Shield argued that the Phar-
macy Agreements would result in cost savings to their policyholders and
Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977) (contracts between insurer and pro-
vider of benefits not related to reliability of insurer and therefore not the business of insur-
ance).
47. 435 U.S. 903 (1978). If the Court had not granted certiorari, and indeed if the Court
had reached a different decision in Group L!fe & Health, Congress probably would have
chosen to deal with the issue during this term. Representative LaFalce has introduced six
bills that would, if enacted, either amend or repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act and create a
Federal Insurance Commission. See H.R. REP. Nos. 1860-1866, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
CONG. REC. H460 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1979). See generally 125 CONG. REC. H449-50 (daily
ed. Feb. 5, 1979) (remarks of Rep. LaFalce). See also Burgoyne, Special Characteristics of
the Business of Insurance, 13 FORUM 911 (1978).
48. Blue Shield's insurance policies themselves were not at issue. Nor was the question
of whether the Pharmacy Agreements were illegal under the antitrust laws before the Court.
49. Justice Stewart was joined by Justices White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens.
50. 440 U.S. at 210.
51. Id. at 211. The majority relied almost exclusively on the Court's language in Varia-
ble Annuity Lfe and National Securities. See notes 22-36 supra and accompanying text.
52. 440 U.S. at 214. Blue Shield argued that the risk insured against was the possibility
that the insured might either suffer a financial loss in the purchase of prescription drugs or
be unable to purchase such drugs. In exchange for a premium Blue Shield assumed this risk
by contracting with participating pharmacies to provide the insured with needed drugs. Id.
at 213.
53. Id. The Court also pointed out the position taken by the United States in its amicus
brief. There is an important distinction between risk underwriting and risk reduction. "By
reducing the total amount it must pay to policyholders, an insurer reduces its liability and
therefore its risk. But unless there is some element of spreading risk more widely, there is no
underwriting of risk." Id. at 214 n.12.
54. Id. at 214.
55. Id: at 216; see SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1.969).
56. 440 U.S. at 216.
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therefore would affect its status as a reliable insurer." The Court re-
sponded that every business decision made by an insurance company has
some impact on its reliability, yet these decisions do not automatically
qualify as the business of insurance.5"
The Court's analysis of the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act reinforced its conclusion that the Pharmacy Agreements were not the
business of insurance. The majority stated that the primary purpose of the
Act was to insure that the states would continue to have the power to tax
and regulate insurance companies59 and that the secondary purpose was to
create a partial exemption from the antitrust laws.6" The scant references
to the meaning of the business of insurance in the legislative history sug-
gested to the majority that Congress understood the business of insurance
to be the underwriting and spreading of risks.6 ' Further, Congress was
convinced that cooperative rate-making was essential to informed risk un-
derwriting.62 Therefore, allowing such cooperative activity between com-
petitors was a prime concern of Congress in enacting the antitrust
exemption." The Court further examined what was commonly under-
stood to be the business of insurance at the time that Congress enacted the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Arrangements similar to Blue Shield's Phar-
macy Agreements were not construed at that time as insurance. Thus, the
Court concluded that Congress could not have intended to broaden the
definition of insurance to include such arrangments.64
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 217. After South-Eastern Underwriters the power of the states to regulate and
tax insurance companies was threatened because, if insurance was interstate commerce, then
the constitutionality of state regulation and taxation would be questionable. The McCarran-
Ferguson Act operated to ensure that the states were free to regulate insurance companies
without fear of commerce clause attack. Id. at 218 n. 18; see notes 9-15 supra and accompa-
nying text. Indeed, the Supreme Court on several occasions had stated specifically that the
primary purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to protect state regulation and taxation
of the insurance industry from commerce clause challenges. See, e.g., FTC v. Travelers
Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S.
310 (1955); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benja-
min, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). See generally Whiting, The Casefor Retaining the Exemption, 13
FORUM 927 (1978); Weller, supra note 19, at 599. But see Rosdeitcher, supra note 17; Note,
supra note 13.
60. 440 U.S. at 218. Even assuming that Congress's primary concern was other than the
preservation of state regulation and taxation of insurance companies, a total antitrust ex-
emption for the business of insurance was not Congress's chief concern. Congress twice
rejected bills that would have provided the insurance industry with a total exemption from
the antitrust laws. See, e.g., 90 CONG. REC. 6565 (1944); S. 1362, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1943); H.R. REP. No. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). See generally 91 CONG. REC. 1087
(1945); 90 CONG. REc. 8482 (1944).
61. 440 U.S. at 220. Factors involved in the underwriting and spreading of risks did not
include insurance company efforts to control costs. See note 19 supra.
62. 440 U.S. at 221; see 90 CONG. REC. A4406 (1944).
63. 440 U.S. at 221; see 91 CONG. REC. 1485 (1945) (remarks of Sen. O'Mahoney); 91
CONG. REc. 1444 (1945) (remarks of Sen. O'Mahoney); 91 CONG. REC. 485 (1945) (remarks
of Sen. Taft).
64. 440 U.S. at 229. Insurance was commonly understood as the payment of a premium
against the risk of an uncertain contingency. When the contingency occurred policyholders
were paid in cash rather than in goods and services. Service-benefit providers were corpora-
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The majority stressed that exemptions from the antitrust laws are to be
construed narrowly.65 To extend the definition of the business of insur-
ance to include such cost control measures as the Pharmacy Agreements
would require exemption for all agreements insurers might make to keep
their costs under control.66 The Court maintained that this extension
would not only have serious anticompetitive consequences67 but would
also ignore the language and purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.68
Clearly, the Court's decision is consistent with a tradition of narrow judi-
cial interpretation of antitrust exemptions.69
Writing for the dissent, Justice Brennan7" defined the issue with greater
specificity: Does the business of insurance include direct contractual ar-
rangements or provider agreements7' between an insurance company and
third parties to furnish benefits owed to the insurer's policyholders?72 The
dissent reasoned that since the status of the underlying drug-benefit policy
as the business of insurance was not challenged, then some provider agree-
ments, including the challenged Pharmacy Agreements, should be consid-
ered part of the business of insurance.73 According to Justice Brennan,
congressional silence as to the meaning of "the business of insurance" indi-
cates that Congress chose to phrase the exemption broadly.74 The dissent
tions organized for the purpose of providing their members with medical services and hospi-
talization benefits in the event of illness rather than a cash indemnification. Generally,
courts had held that service-benefit providers were not engaged in the business of insurance.
See Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939); California Physicians'
Serv. v. Garrison, 155 P.2d 885 (Cal. App. 1945), af,#d, 28 Cal. 2d 790, 172 P.2d 4 (1946);
Commissioner of Banking & Ins. v. Community Health Serv., 129 N.J.L. 427, 30 A.2d 44
(1943); State ex rel. Fishback v. Universal Serv. Agency, 87 Wash. 413, 151 P. 768 (1915).
But see Cleveland Hosp. Serv. Ass'n v. Ebright, 142 Ohio St. 51, 49 N.E.2d 929 (1943). The
Court further observed that historically Blue Shield, as well as the courts, has maintained
that Blue Cross and Blue Shield are not insurance companies. See generally S. LAW, BLUE
CROSS WHAT WENT WRONG? (1976).
65. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n., 425 U.S. 1 (1976); Con-
nell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); Federal Maritime Comm'n v.
Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973); United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351
U.S. 305 (1956).
66. 440 U.S. at 232. The Court illustrated this point with examples that included auto
body repair shops, landlords, hospitals, physicians, and attorneys. Id. at 232 n.40.
67. Id. at 232. The Court based its statement on the well-known fact that physicians
and health care providers dominate Blue Shield organizations. Because it is in the interest
of these groups to set fee schedules as high as possible there is little incentive within Blue
Shield to minimize costs. Assuming that its conclusion regarding the health care field is
correct, the Court nevertheless fails to discuss the possible anticompetitive consequences of
such agreements in other industries.
68. Id.
69. See note 65 supra.
70. Justice Brennan was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Marshall and Powell.
71. Provider agreements (like the Pharmacy Agreements) are contractual arrangements
between a service-benefit provider (such as Blue Shield) and third parties for the provision
of benefits to policyholders in the form of goods and services.
72. 440 U.S. at 233.
73. Id. at 234. The dissent reached this conclusion because, unlike the majority, it con-
cluded that the Pharmacy Agreements were an integral part of the insurance contract and
therefore the two were indistinguishable.
74. Id. Congress, in fact, rejected bills that limited the business of insurance to a nar-
row specified list of practices. See S. REP. No. 12, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); 90 CONG.
REC. A4406 (1944).
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argued that insurance is an evolving institution,75 and, therefore, "if ele-
ments common to the ordinary understanding of 'insurance' are present,
new forms of the business should constitute the 'business of insurance' for
purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act." 7
6
Justice Brennan insisted that Blue Shield's drug-benefit policy is the
business of insurance because it clearly transfers and distributes risks.77
The only difference between Blue Shield's insurance policy and other
forms of health insurance is that Blue Shield pays the policyholder in
goods and services rather than cash. 78 Historically, service-benefit plans
were a widespread and well-recognized form of health insurance, 79 and
these plans were subject to state regulation as insurance.8" According to
the dissent, some kind of provider agreement is logically necessary for a
service-benefit insurer to meet policy obligations to the insureds.8 The
dissent pointed to a history of pervasive state insurance regulation of hos-
pitalization benefit plans whose distinctive feature was a provider agree-
ment with participating hospitals to provide services to insureds.82 Justice
Brennan referred to the Court's earlier decision in FTC v. National Casu-
alty Co. ,3 in which the advertising of insurance, which involves neither
the underwriting of risks nor the relationship between the insurer and the
insured, was held to be within the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.84
The dissent observed that the legislative history was replete with examples
of activities that did not involve underwriting yet were regarded by Con-
gress as within the scope of the Act's exemption.85 The dissent distin-
guished between arrangements that directly relate to the carrying out of
policy obligations and arrangements that relate only to the general opera-
75. 440 U.S. at 238 (citing SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71
(1959)).
76. 440 U.S. at 238.
77. Id. at 239.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 240. In 1945, the year the McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed, 61% of the
total hospital insurance market was composed of service-benefit plans. See Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, A National Health Program, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
173 (1946).
80. The dissent stated that "regulation of the service-benefit plans was a part of the
system of state regulation of insurance that the McCarran-Ferguson Act was designed to
preserve." 440 U.S. at 240.
81. The dissent relied on the language in National Securities, see note 35 supra and
accompanying text, and concluded that the Pharmacy Agreements met the criteria stated by
the Court. A provider contract in a service-benefit plan is critical to "the type of policy
which could be issued" as well as to its "reliability" and "enforcement." 393 U.S. at 460.
82. 440 U.S. at 245.
83. 357 U.S. 560 (1958) (per curiam).
84. Id. at 563-65.
85. For example, Congress regarded numerous horizontal rate agreements between in-
surance companies that did not technically involve the underwriting of risk as within the
scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's antitrust exemption. 440 U.S. at 244. In addition,
vertical relationships between insurance companies and independent sales agencies, the sub-
ject of the conflict in South-Eastern Underwriters, were expressly included as part of the
business of insurance in an early draft of the Act. 90 CoNG. REC. A4406 (1944). Two such
examples are rate agreements and transactions between agents and insurers.
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tion of the insurance company. 6 Justice Brennan concluded that the chal-
lenged Pharmacy Agreements are necessary to allow Blue Shield to fulfill
the obligations of its service-benefit policy.87 Further, these Pharmacy
Agreements direcly affect insurance rates, costs, and insurer reliability and
constitute an important factor in risk prediction.88 On this basis, the dis-
sent argued that the provider agreements are included within the business
of insurance and therefore should be exempt from antitrust scrutiny.
89
The dissent proposed a case-by-case analysis of provider agreements.9 °
The majority nevertheless declared that all provider agreements are not the
business of insurance. 9'
In view of the current legislative sentiment 9' to limit antitrust exemp-
tions, the Court's failure to clarify the antitrust exemption for the business
of insurance may provide the necessary incentive for congressional ac-
tion.93 Otherwise, the debate as to the meaning of the phrase in other con-
texts will continue in the courts. In the meantime, the effect of the Court's
decision will compel many insurance companies to reexamine their con-
tracts with third-party providers of goods and services.94 The decision
should have an important effect on insurance industry cost containment
efforts.95 Assuming that provider agreements have played a significant
role in health insurance industry efforts at cost containment, the agree-
ments' new nonexempt status will discourage their use. Yet, while the cost
86. In contrast, the majority found that all such arrangements are not the business of
insurance. 440 U.S. at 224. According to the dissent, the former arrangement would consti-
tute the business of insurance; the latter arrangement would not. Id. at 253. See also note
89 infra.
87. 440 U.S. at 252.
88. Id. at 253.
89. Id. Although this provider agreement is the business of insurance, the dissent
would not conclude that all provider agreements are the business of insurance. The other
two requirements of the McCarran-Ferguson Act would have to be met in order to qualify
for the exemption. Id. These requirements are that the challenged conduct must be regu-
lated by the state and that the conduct must not constitute a boycott. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012(a) &
1013(b) (1976); see notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text. In addition, an insurance
company could not immunize an otherwise prohibited conspiracy by joining it. Similarly,
an exclusive arrangement between an insurance company and a single provider, only tenu-
ously related to the provision of policyholder benefits, also would not be exempt. Seegener-
ally Whiting, supra note 59, at 633-36.
90. 440 U.S. at 252.
91. Id. at 223-24.
92. See 125 CoNG. REC. H449-50 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1979) (remarks of Rep. LaFalce).
See generally Whiting, supra note 59, at 927-28.
93. See note 47 supra. As of this date Congress has taken no action on the pending
legislation.
94. See Pharmacy antitrust ruling affects prepaid legal plans, 65 A.B.A.J. 544 (1979).
95. It is evident that the majority and the dissent were clearly concerned about the
rising cost of health care yet differed in their perceptions of how cost control could best be
achieved. The majority seems to assume that the lowest prices for goods and services can be
found in the free marketplace. It notes, for example, that the chief concern of insurance
companies is maximization of profits and not cost containment, pointing to the disinclina-
tion of physician-dominated Blue Shield plans to minimize costs. 440 U.S. at 232 n.40. In
response, the dissent stated that the policy aspects of cost control were not as one-sided as
the Court described and that settlement of the cost containment controversy was best left to
Congress. Id. at 256.n.26.
1104 [Vol. 33
